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Governing the Commons The evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Elinor Ostrom

Por: Tipo de material: TextoTextoIdioma: eng Detalles de publicación: New York, USA Cambridge University Press 2015Edición: 1° EdiciónDescripción: 296 páginas Figuras, tablas 21.5 cmISBN:
  • 978-1-107-56978-2
Tema(s): Clasificación CDD:
  • 333.2 O85
Contenidos:
Contents -- Preface -- CHAPTER 1 - REFLECTIONS ON THE COMMONS -- CHAPTER 2 - AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF SELF-ORGANIZATION AND SELF-GOVERNANCE IN CPR SITUATIONS -- CHAPTER 3 - ANALYZING LONG-ENDURING, SELF-ORGANIZED, AND SELF-GOVERNED CPRs -- CHAPTER 4 - ANALYZING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE -- CHAPTER 5 - ANALYZING INSTITUTIONAL FAILURES AND FRAGILITIES -- CHAPTER 6 - A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF SELF-ORGANIZING AND SELF-GOVERNING CPRs -- Notes -- References -- Index.
Resumen: The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
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Contents -- Preface -- CHAPTER 1 - REFLECTIONS ON THE COMMONS -- CHAPTER 2 - AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF SELF-ORGANIZATION AND SELF-GOVERNANCE IN CPR SITUATIONS -- CHAPTER 3 - ANALYZING LONG-ENDURING, SELF-ORGANIZED, AND SELF-GOVERNED CPRs -- CHAPTER 4 - ANALYZING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE -- CHAPTER 5 - ANALYZING INSTITUTIONAL FAILURES AND FRAGILITIES -- CHAPTER 6 - A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF SELF-ORGANIZING AND SELF-GOVERNING CPRs -- Notes -- References -- Index.

The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.

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